Introduction
Why are companies that provide e-mail not regulated as 'common carriers'? They file no tariffs with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) or state regulators. They have no duty to provide service on the same terms to all-comers. They may discriminate fiercely among their customers, negotiating discounts and special contracts with impunity. They have no obligation to offer universal service. They may be owned by foreigners; they may even operate their servers from overseas. They may transmit content of their creation over their e-mail networks: advertisements, graphic or sound attachments-whatever they like. They may cut off service to disfavored economic too, not just technological. WGBH, SprintNet and TCI do not compete against Bell Atlantic today. Once their radios and wires are all digital, they very well may.
'Data' may still be regulated as 'incidental', something on the fringe, but it is fast becoming the center of all communications. In a digital world, this is tautologically true. All digital traffic is 'data', however it may be viewed, listened to or processed by eyes, ears or machines at the outer edges of the network.
Data: Incidental and Unregulated
Voice, video, fax and data normally require different amounts of bandwidth and different levels of fidelity (transmission accuracy). They also tolerate different amounts of interruption and discontinuity in the transmission. Links between computers, for example, typically require very high accuracy, but can accept occasional interruptions or delays; voice and video links tolerate more dropped bits, but must be continuous.
Considerations of engineering efficiency have historically favored different architectures for different types of communications. The telephone network was optimized for point-to-point voice communications between individuals. Broadcasting infrastructure was designed for point-to-all transmissions. Cable plant began life as a 'community antenna', distributing video from a local headend without two-way or switching capabilities. All of these architectures and capabilities originated in the day of analog technology and narrowband transmission. Only data networks, which arrived much later, were designed from the outset around a digital, broadband model that supported both point-to-point and point-to-multipoint transmission.
These basic engineering differences made it easy for regulators to maintain different regulatory regimes for different media and the communications companies that operated them. Drawing legal distinctions between a 'common-carrier phone company" and a 'broadcaster' was straightforward. Until the advent of digital computers and modems, there was too little in the way of 'data communications' to merit much regulatory attention at all.
'Enhanced' Services
When digital computers began to multiply, about three decades ago, the FCC resolved to leave 'enhanced' services outside the ambit of telephone regulation. Much of the Commission's energy since has been directed at preventing regulated phone companies from providing anything more than 'basic' transport.
At the same time, however, the FCC ruled that all providers of 'computer-enhanced' services (as well as computers themselves, and other forms of 'customer premises equipment') would be left completely unregulated {see Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC2d at 428 (enhanced services); id. at 447 (CPE)]. No franchise. No tariffs. No oversight of any kind. To make sure that no state regulator did otherwise, the FCC defined 'enhanced' services to be exclusively under federal jurisdiction (see id. at 428-9) even as it declared that it would 'forbear' from regulating them at all (see id. at 428).
This protected the enhanced services industry from the phone company, but it did not protect the phone industry from providers of enhanced services. Nothing in the FCC regulations, then or now, stops a provider of enhanced services from building a phone company out the back of its computers. The Commission simply assumed, without ever examining the question seriously, that the 'enhanced service providers' (ESPs)-which materialized later with names like CompuServe or America Online-would go on plugging the computers into transport purchased from the monopoly phone company. But nothing stops the ESP from building out transport networks as well: copper, coax, fiber-optic cable, or any licensed radio, terrestrial or satellite.
So take the deregulated tail of the telephone-»-the 'enhanced service'-build it out to make a complete dog, and you have a deregulated phone company. To be sure, the new beast must continue supplying enough 'enhancements' to its transport to keep it on the deregulated side of the 'basic'/'enhanced' line, but that may not take much. Free e-mail might do the trick. Or free dial-up services for morning weather or traffic reports. Nobody knows the full answer. Perhaps we will not learn it until The Microsoft Network (say) reaches $50 billion (say) in revenue.
We do already know the answer for e-mail. As discussed more fully below, e-mail substitutes, in some measure, for fax connections and telephone talk time. And the same networks that carry e-mail can already carry live voice conversations too, though not yet very well. In other words, the outlines of the fully deregulated phone company are rapidly taking shape, all under the legally pregnant, but technically and economically meaningless, label of 'enhanced service'.
Just how much is it worth to wrap a little 'enhancement' around your telephone company? If your lines are long, close to 7 cents a minute. Unenhanced long-distance phone companies like AT&T and MCI pay local phone companies about that much to originate and terminate ordinary voice 810 calls. That is more than local transport actually costs, but under an FCC plan formulated decades ago, and now politically entrenched, long-distance voice carriers are required to contribute very generously to the maintenance of local networks and the promotion of universal service. 2 Except for any service labeled 'enhanced'.
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The FCC recognized in 1987 that this distinction makes no sense-ESPs use precisely the same local lines as are used for voice calls, and indeed use them (on a per-customer basis) a lot more. But there was a great political outcry when the FCC proposed spreading the access charge burden, and the idea died. 4 It was revisited again in early 1997, but went nowhere. In this regard, the FCC succeeded only in raising monthly fees on second residential phone lines, the lines most often used for data access. Local phone companies gain a measure of regulatory freedom, too, when they can define a new service as 'enhanced' rather than 'basic'. The Regional Bells remain generally barred from the long distance business, but the 1996 Telecommunications Act exempts 'incidental' long-distance services from that quarantine [see 47 U.S.C. § §271(bX3), (g)]. Roughly speaking, all computercentered enhanced services fall under that exemption. ' Finally, a bill now pending before Congress would prohibit state and local governments from imposing taxes of any kind on Internet access and online services, and would bar both federal and state regulation of the prices subscribers pay for Internet and computer services [see 'The Internet Tax Freedom Act', H.R. 1054 , 105 Cong., 1st Sess. (1997 Commission also has historically drawn a strict line between 'broadcast' and 'carriage' and has generally barred broadcasters from transferring control over their spectrum, or pieces of it, to third parties (see Shelanski, 1997 . In small increments, however, the FCC has carved out exceptions for data traffic piggy-backed on broadcast media. In the 1970s, the Commission reinterpreted its rules to allow FM radio stations to provide 'visual' services, 12 using the 'subcarrier' 13 portions of their assigned frequency bands. In the early 1980s the Commission eliminated all limitations on FM subcarrier transmissions, permitting 'any legitimate communication purpose whether broadcast related or not'. The Commission expressly exempted these activities from traditional broadcaster regulation (such as the fairness doctrine and equal time rule) and other 'public interest' obligations. In theory, FM subcarrier services (unless privately offered) can be subject to Title II obligations, but the FCC has never actively sought to enforce any such requirements. The FCC has similarly avoided imposing any regulatory obligations on data transmitted in the interstices of television bands, known as the vertical blanking interval (VBI). " The Commission defined these services as 'of a broadcast nature' that permits 'visual presentation of the information so transmitted, e.g., on a viewing screen or a graphic record'. " Spectrum can be subdivided into a main channel and a number of 'subchannels' or 'subcarriers', both of which can be transmitted simultaneously. " The VBI is the momentary blank period between picture frames in a television broadcast (Newton, 1996, p. 646 ). The first commercial use of VBI, teletext Ca data system for the transmission of textual and graphic information intended for display on viewing screens'), was authorized by the FCC in 1983 at the urging of the television broadcasting industry. subcarrier bands, have been deemed common carrier, the Commission has chosen to forbear from imposing traditional Title II requirements.
The Commission seems headed in the same regulatory direction with new rules that allow broadcast television licensees to transmit data within their main video signals. The rules allow virtually any type of data to be transmitted, as long as such transmissions do not interfere with the video transmission itself. The Commission has already stated that it would follow the VBI model in deciding how (not) to regulate these services.
The Commission has been more systematic in deregulating data transmission via Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS). Since the genesis of DBS, the Commission has actively encouraged its use for digital data transmission and other non-video uses. DBS does not fit the definition of 'cable' and is therefore not subject to Title VI regulation. DBS operators have instead been given the choice to operate under Title II or Title III for all or part of their service. But as either carrier 15 or broadcaster, 16 a DBS operator faces only a minimalist set of regulations. Although the 1992 Cable Act half-heartedly directed the FCC to impose broadcast's 'public interest' duties on DBS operators, 17 today DBS operators have unprecedented freedom to use their satellite spectrum for any mix of services, including data (see Shelanski and Huber, 1998) . In April 1995, for example, Hughes launched its DirecPC data transmission service, which provides a 400 kbps Internet downlink via DBS transponders.
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The DBS model is now being pushed down to the terrestrial level as well, with the advent of all-digital Advanced Television (ATV). Pursuant to the 1996 Act, the Commission was authorized to hand over additional spectrum licenses for ATV to incumbent broadcasters, free of charge (see 47 U.S.C. §336). When broadcasters begin digital transmissions over these new bands, they will be free to deliver 'ancillary or supplementary services' if consistent with the 'public interest, convenience and necessity' 19 In its April 1997 ATV order, the Commission defined these services quite broadly, to include 'subscription television programming, computer software distribution, data transmissions, teletext, interactive services, audio signals, and any other services that do not interfere with the required free service'. Pursuant to its mandate under the 1996 Act, the Commission has determined that 'nonbroadcast services provided by digital licensees will be regulated in a manner consistent with analogous services provided by other persons or entities'. The Commission immediately likened this to its policies regarding FM subcarrier and VBI.
Other Wireless Data Services
The FCC restricts how radio licensees may use their spectrum, in two principal ways. First, the Commission prescribes what types of services may be transmitted over certain spectrum bands.
20 Second, the Commission generally prevents radio licensees from slicing up their spectrum (into either geographic or frequency sub-bands) and allocating it for different uses. But the Commission has not used these rules to prohibit the digitization of existing wireless networks, and has been consistently lax in applying the rules to the new digital networks now being deployed. Moreover, the Commission has so far kept to a bare minimum the regulation of services provided over these digital wireless networks. The Commission's first major decision along these lines involved Nextel, formerly Fleet Call. Nextel amassed SMR licenses that were traditionally used for taxi dispatch service. It then sought permission from the FCC to digitize its analog SMR spectrum to provide Enhanced SMR (ESMR) service, including all types of voice and data applications. In 1991, the Commission granted Nextel's request. Despite the remarkable similarities between the proposed ESMR service and cellular service, the Commission permitted Nextel to remain 'private', and thus beyond the reach of Title II requirements.
Largely because of the disparities that the Commission's deregulation of new digital services like Nextel created (see Paper, 1996) , Congress stepped in and directed the Commission to regulate similar services similarly [see A prime beneficiary of the Commission's permissive regime was digital PCS. PCS was conceived as a general, all-purpose digital service that could compete directly with cellular, but also provide a wide array of other data-type services. 22 The PCS licenses issued by the FCC accordingly permit a wide range of services to be provided. 23 The FCC has so far accepted that all PCS services would be regulated equally. Under the Commission's existing rules this means that no rate or entry/exit regulations will apply. Other wireless networks that are either already digital or soon will be are being afforded similar liberties. The Commission has permitted the digitization of existing cellular networks, and has already removed restrictions on the types of services that cellular licensees may provide. 24 The Commission has given similar flexibility to several new wireless services, including IVDS and Wireless Communications Service (WCS). Each of these digital services-like ESMR and PCS-will remain free of any serious regulatory obligations.
Technological Imperatives
Today, digital networks of every type are adding bandwidth (to support voice and video), two-way capabilities (to support real-time voice) and error correction (to support data). Voice, video and data are converging on the same wireless and wireline networks:
25 (i) all media are moving towards a common currency of digital transmission; (ii) the demand and supply for bandwidth is increasing in every medium; (iii) scrambling, addressing and two-way capabilities are being added across the board. Digital technology and high bandwidth obliterate engineering and economic distinctions between different types of electronic communication. Not simply because 'a bit is a bit'. The key point is that high bandwidth digital networks, both wired and wireless, are extremely flexible. They can readily be configured and interconnected to mimic any of the capabilities of any of the old analog systems.
Going Digital
All wireless and wireline media are rapidly going digital. Some carriers are upgrading or replacing existing facilities with new, digital components. Others are entering markets with digital technology from the ground up.
Telephony. The digitization of the telephone network has been underway for over 20 years. Almost all long-distance transmissions are already digital. " ADSL can transmit data at up to 12 Mbps; the current maximum rate for ordinary copper a 336 Icbps.
Two-way Capabilities
As the bandwidth increases, addressing and filtering become essential. Addressability alone is often a close substitute for two-way capability, when the return path is used only to lodge a request for information. A credit card can be verified in response to a request initiated over a two-way phone line; alternatively, it can be verified by continuously transmitting an encoded, suitably addressed list of invalid cards to a storage device at the point of sale.
Digital technology also makes it easy to plug together two-way services by interconnecting hybrid networks. That is often the best way to proceed when upstream and downstream bandwidth requirements are highly asymmetric. Cable or satellite, for example, can provide a downlink, with telephone lines or narrowband terrestrial wireless closing the loop. 48 The abundance of cheap digital processing makes it easy to combine different media in this way. Two-way capabilities, or at least addressability, can also be added with encryption and scrambling devices. Sophisticated coding algorithms that scramble what is sent can be readily combined with terminal equipment smart enough to decode it. The descramblers installed at the end of the cable television lines perform such functions today. So do numerous types of communications software located in personal computers. With enough encoding of this type it is possible to add two-way capabilities to any type of digital bandwidth, and convert it for any use. For example, television and cellular telephony both use broadcast technology: a pocket cellular phone, like a TV station, transmits outward in all directions. A television station uses 6 MHz; a cellular telephone network uses 25 MHz. Combine four TV licenses and encode the signals, and you have the makings of a cellular network.
Deregulation
How telecommunications services are regulated today depends in large part on what the FCC calls them. The categories adopted by the Commission center on the official identity or status of the company providing the service, the identity or status of the consumer or interconnected enterprise at the other end, the technology used in between and the geographic location over which the service is provided. A complex regulatory taxonomy has grown up over many decades. It distinguishes wire from wireless, carriage from broadcast, broadcast from cable, voice from video, and both voice and video from data.
It draws lines based on the type of content conveyed, the prices charged or not charged for conveying it, the wealth of the conveying company and the novelty of the service.
But the digital telecosm does not conform to these established regulatory categories.
Zoned Media
A diverse array of FCC rules 'zone' telecommunications networks and the companies that own them. Separate services are confined to separate regulatory neighborhoods to further a wide variety of policy objectives, from promoting competition, at one extreme, to promoting universal service by protecting monopoly at the other.
A company or network zoned as a 'carrier' is required to convey the content of others; one zoned as a 'broadcaster' must carry content of its own.* The 1934 Communications Act defines telephony, the common carrier paradigm, as two-way 'intercommunicating' voice service (47 U.S.C. §153 (47) : 821
1934 Act requires phone companies to obtain advance FCC permission before constructing new interstate facilities [see 47 U.S.C. §2l4(a)]. Section 201 empowers the Commission to regulate devices connected to the telephone network, and thus, in principle, to regulate every service offered over a telephone line by a phone company or anyone else (see 47 U.S.C. §201). The FCC has used this authority to restrict phone companies to providing basic voice services and little else. The FCC is likewise granted plenary authority over use of the radio waves, and has used it over the years to prescribe in great detail how spectrum may be used. 33 Radio licenses are generally issued for a specific use, such as 'public broadcasting'. A licensee may not convert its spectrum to any other use without first obtaining FCC approval.
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For much of their history, most zoning regulations roughly tracked the technological capabilities of the various wireline and wireless media to which they applied." With the advent of digital technology, they no longer do. Any digital network can support encryption and addressing, which make possible point-to-point messaging: the Internet already permits slightly tinny, two-way voice conversations. 56 As bandwidth increases, any digital network can likewise support one-to-many communication: even on the slow, analog bandwidth of ordinary phone lines, for example, the Internet already can deliver live radio broadcasts. 57 With digital broadband technology, today's text-based bulletin boards will support voice and video-the Internet equivalent of radio and television. E-mail will support voice and video too-the Internet equivalent of telephony and videophones. High-speed data links on cable networks will offer similar capabilities, spanning everything from voice telephony to digital television. 58 Digital technology also makes it " Digital cable radio is increasingly becoming an attractive alternative to commercial radio. Subscribers are provided with a control box which connects a home stereo system to a cable line (Minge, 1996) . easy to assemble hybrid networks out of the old media. DirecPC, for example, offers 400 kbps digital Internet downlinks by satellite to PCs, with the loop closed in the other direction via ordinary phone lines.
Pure carriage can certainly survive as a business in a digital, broadband world, and undoubtedly will. But who will provide pure carriage, on which assemblies of wires and radios, is much less clear. The owner of a UHF station licensed to broadcast sitcom re-runs twenty-four hours a day might do far better using the same spectrum to transmit digital wireless e-mail, a common-carrier service (see generally Shelanski and Huber, 1998) . In rural areas, wireless telephony may be both cheaper and much more valuable than wired; the best use of existing phone wires may be for a next-generation of digital video-on-demand.
The FCC is gradually coming to realize that only market forces can work out what makes sense.
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Billing Relationships
A second large compendium of regulation is engaged by how a service gets billed: who is paying, at which end of the call or transmission, for what. Often the regulatory objective is simply to maintain 'affordable' 'basic' service of some sort.
In telephony, the 1934 Act draws specific distinctions between service paid for by means of an 'exchange access charge'-that is, a fixed flat-rate [see 47 U.S.C. §153(47XA)]-and 'toll' service paid for by the minute. The former is labeled local "telephone exchange service', and regulated quite differently from the latter. Regional Bell phone companies are also still subject to regulations that prescribe how bills may or may not be consolidated and presented to customers (see United States v. Western Elec. Co., 552 F.Supp. 131, at 198-199 (D.D.C., 1982) ; 47 C.F.R. §271(a)].
The Commission has likewise labored to distinguish 'pay TV" and 'subscription services' from traditional broadcasting, and has required that the latter be paid for exclusively by advertisers. The for-pay variations have been largely de-regulated; only the 'free' broadcasters are still viewed as quasipublic servants, specially privileged to use attractive blocks of spectrum and therefore specially obligated to use it to advance the public interest.
For many years, the FCC distinguished cable from broadcasting largely on the basis of the subscription fees charged, and barred cable from competing for advertising revenues [see FCC (1972); FCC (1975) , reversed by Home Box Office (HBO) v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 22. (DCC, 1977) ; FCC (1986)}. The 1992 Cable Act imposes price regulation on 'basic' cable services (see 47 U.S.C. §543)-re-transmitted local broadcasting signals [see 47 U.S.C. § §543(bX7), 522(3)}-while allowing 'premium services'-'cable programming', and pay-per-view events-to be deregulated [see 47 U.S.C. §543(c)}.
Regulation tied to specific billing events (or their absence), or to the form that bills are supposed to take, cannot practically be enforced against providers and transporters of digital data. With digital media connected to digital set-top boxes and computers, it is easy to add a charge, however nominal, to any type of service. Or to remove it. Cable companies can sell advertising, sell movies or sell jewelry on shopping channels. Internet 'push' services, like PointCast, sell advertising by CNN to desktop viewers. Digital channels and smart viewers support any mix of direct billing, advertiser revenues and sales of costume jewelry. Bills can be consolidated, delivered and paid over the same digital channels that convey the message or the entertainment. 60 An on-line bill becomes a piece of accounting hypertext, with subsidiary charges and invoices buried beneath the top line-a single, integrated charge for what appears to the customer, if the customer chooses, as a single, integrated bill paid, or any number of smaller and more detailed pieces, with advertising in the mix in precisely the proportions that market supply and demand dictate.
Dialing/Routing
Much regulation is engaged by, or pivots on, technical aspects of how communications are addressed or routed. Sometimes the regulatory objective is to promote competition, sometimes it is to favor particular incumbents. In telephony, the 'equal access' mandate of the Bell divestiture decree required Regional Bell Companies to offer all subscribers '1 + ' access to a 'preferred interexchange carrier' (PIC) designated in advance by the *° Microsoft and First DUB recently announced a joint venture to offer billing services to 'electric, gas, telephone and other concerns" (see WkU Strut Jtmraai, June 27, 1997, B-5).
subscriber. No comparable access guarantees were extended to providers of other competing local packet carriers, information services or competing providers of local exchange services. Bell Companies were also permitted to continue routing all' 1 +' intraLATA toll traffic over their own networks. The 1996 Act, by contrast, directs local phone companies eventually to provide "intraLATA dialing parity', 61 mandates 'local number portability' and provides seamless connections between competing local carriers that require no extra-digit dialing.
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The FCC further requires carriers to pass to each other signaling information associated with interstate calls, so that callers may obtain services like Caller ID (see 47 C.F.R. §61.1601). Carriers must recognize certain customer dialing patterns as requests to turn privacy on (*67) or off(*82), on a per-call basis (see 47 C.F.R. §61.1601). All LECs must offer subscribers the option to block access to 900 services, which often contain subject matter considered unfit for minors (see 47 C.F.R. §64. It is hard to see how any of these regulatory legacies can (or should) be extended to digital data networks, or the phone calls, television or other content that such networks transmit. On digital media, customer software readily controls access, addressing and routing. The whole notion of a unique PIC, stored in a centralized, bottleneck, database, is obsolete. The Internet's TCP/IP protocols can effectively implement choices of carriers and servers that are much more flexible than the addressing systems adopted by telephone and broadcast networks decades ago. Control is maintained on customer premises and by the customer's own hardware and software. Distinctions based on whether signals are delivered scrambled or encrypted, and thus made unavailable to certain groups, are likewise obsolete for digital media where scrambling of some sort is instantaneous and automatic. Scramblers and descramblers alike are software on microprocessors, so cheap they are placed as a matter of course in every cell phone, computer and set-top box. In overturning the CDA, for example, the Supreme Court recognized that 'currently available user-based software' could be installed by parents to preclude their children from accessing indecent and obscene material on the Internet [see Janet Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, No. 96-511, S.Ct. , at (June 26, 1997 ), citing Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, at 842 (finding 73XED Pa., 1996 ].
Geography
A last, large segment of the regulatory apparatus is devoted to maintaining jurisdictional lines and divisions of responsibility among local and federal regulators. Transmissions of all kinds are regulated according to where they originate and terminate, or how far they travel. Content is stamped with 'country of origin' and 'shipping' labels, in much the same way as textiles.
The 1934 Communications Act divides regulatory jurisdiction over 'interstate' and 'intrastate' telephone services between the federal government and the states respectively. All telephone lines, switches, traffic, costs, revenues, profits and everything else must be separated along these basic jurisdictional lines. The Bell divestiture decree defined 164 'local access and transport areas' (LATAs), and forbids Bell Companies to provide 'interLATA' services [see United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp.131, 227 (DDC, 1982) ]; the 1996 Act initially leaves those restrictions in place. Broadcasters and cable operators are often required to carry 'community programming' in exchange for their respective permits to operate, and are subject to other federal laws that require them to carry programming deemed to satisfy 'local' needs. Both cable operators and broadcasters must also abide by local obscenity standards based on 'contemporary community standards'.
Digital data networks and services defy most attempts at regulatory cartography. On the Internet, for example, it is almost impossible to track where 'calls' originate, what communications paths are travelled, or where information is ultimately delivered or consumed. Content is readily hybridized; a display on a single computer can be synthesized out of data 826 residing on, and delivered from, any number of others, located anywhere on the globe.
Conclusion
The data world, and digital technology generally, emerged at a time when the regulatory pendulum already had begun to swing toward deregulation. Regulators who were struggling to deregulate handsets were not inclined to regulate computers. Regulators who were deregulating analog AM radio were not inclined to regulate digital DBS. Regulators who were removing restrictions on the use of spectrum were not inclined to limit the use of digital PCS.
In hindsight, defenders of regulation might see the deregulation of data as the result of prescient policies, designed to facilitate the digital revolution, nurture an infant industry or foster competition from new technologies. But it is more probable that data simply slipped through the regulatory cracks. Regulators were so busy removing yesterday's services and technologies from the swamp of excess regulation that they just did not bother with the new stuff.
